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COMMENTS
THE DOCTRINE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY: AN
UNNECESSARY INTRUSION INTO
SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution pro-
vides members of Congress with absolute immunity from lawsuit for their
legislative activities.' The United States Supreme Court2 has construed
the protection provided by the Speech or Debate Clause into the current
doctrine of legislative immunity.3 This immunity presently extends only
to a congressional member's 4 "purely legislative" activities and not to
nonlegislative, official, or political duties.5 Members of Congress and
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
2. The Supreme Court has never considered an alternate form of immunity in the 11
legislative immunity doctrine cases it has heard. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111,
130 (1979) (denying immunity for alleged defamatory statements made in press releases
and newsletters); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490-91 (1979) (granting immu-
nity for grand jury testimony regarding specific legislative acts); Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 (1975) (granting immunity to committee members
issuing subpoenas duces tecum); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973) (extending
immunity to materials contained in committee hearing report); Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606, 622 (1972) (denying immunity to senator's aide for private publication of
otherwise protected legislative materials); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 528-29
(1972) (denying immunity from prosecution on bribery charges); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 505-06 (1969) (granting immunity to members for passage of illegal resolu-
tion excluding a representative-elect); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (ex-
tending immunity to senator while denying it to his aide for alleged Fourth Amendment
violations); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966) (granting immunity
against judicial inquiry into motivations for congressman's speech); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (extending immunity analogous to Speech or Debate Clause pro-
tection to statements made by state legislators included in the legislative record); Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204-05 (1881) (extending immunity to House members, but not
to the Sergeant-at-Arms for false imprisonment of hearing witness).
3. For the history of cases interpreting this Clause, see infra notes 43-115 and accom-
panying text.
4. For purposes of this Comment, the term "members" refers to both United States
Senators and Representatives.
5. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512 (detailing numerous "political" activities that will not
receive Speech or Debate Clause protection); see also infra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text.
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some legal commentators decry the Supreme Court's limited view of the
legislative immunity doctrine. They argue that the escalating volume of
nonlegislative, constituent-related case work warrants the same protec-
tion as "purely legislative" functions.6
Whether members' nonlegislative functions warrant separate immunity
protection is a growing source of controversy in the federal court system.7
Recently, this debate has ripened through the litigation of defamation
suits against members of Congress involving conduct beyond the pro-
tected legislative sphere.8 Members have responded to these suits by
reaching outside the Speech or Debate Clause for common law immunity
protection.9 They have relied upon the extra-constitutional doctrine of
official immunity,' ° which currently protects executive and judicial
6. See, e.g., Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress: Hearings Before the
Joint Comm. on Congressional Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Immunity Hearings] (statement of Rep. Cleveland) ("[T]he Court labors in abysmal
ignorance of the real processes of representative government."); id. at 7 (statement of Rep.
Brooks) ("We are concerned with recent interpretations of legislative immunity by the
Supreme Court, interpretations so restrictive as to almost make a mockery of the intent of
the constitutional language .... "); 134 CONG. REC. 10,579 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Hughes) ("Exposing legislators to civil liability, for doing things which are unquestionably
within the scope of their official duties .... will undermine the ability of elected officials to
exercise oversight of the conduct of Government projects and programs."); Robert J. Rein-
stein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1113, 1146 (1973) (advocating a broad interpretation of the legislative immunity
doctrine to preserve the functional independence of the legislative branch); Richard D.
Batchelder, Jr., Note, Chastain v. Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the Doctrine of Legisla-
tive Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 384, 402-03 (1990) (positing that a narrow reading of
the legislative immunity doctrine will undermine members' informing function).
7. See, e.g., Williams v. Brooks, 945 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying immu-
nity protection for statements made in a press conference), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996
(1992); Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying immunity pro-
tection for statements printed in a letter to the Attorney General), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1240 (1988); McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 99-102 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (sug-
gesting that members performing non-legislative official functions, challenged as violating
statutory and constitutional law, could receive qualified immunity protection), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1005 (1985); Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 932-33 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984); see also United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 291 (6th Cir. 1978)
(extending "common law speech or debate privilege" immunity to state legislators only for
acts within the Supreme Court's historical definition of legislative activity), rev'd, 445 U.S.
360 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1979) (involving member's
private publication of libelous statements); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1973)
(involving disparaging remarks about private citizen included in committee report);
Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1330-31 (involving member's statements made in a press conference);
Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 312-13 (involving member's statements included in a letter to the
Attorney General).
9. See, e.g., Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1325; Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 316.
10. The official immunity doctrine was judicially created to protect the functions of
executive and judicial branch officials in the absence of constitutional protection analogous
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branch officials from civil liability.1' The United States circuit courts of
appeals, however, have refused to apply the official immunity doctrine to
members' nonlegislative activities and continue to limit Speech or Debate
Clause immunity to members' legislative functions. 2 Nonetheless, the
thrust of recent legal commentary urges expansion of the legislative im-
munity doctrine to include official immunity. 3 Although the Supreme
Court has chosen not to address the issue directly, both sides of the argu-
ment might find support for their positions implicit in the Court's recent
legislative immunity decisions.' 4
The possibility of expanding the legislative immunity doctrine raises
several important issues. First, will expanding the legislative immunity
doctrine to protect a member's nonlegislative functions comport with the
intentions of the Constitution's Framers? As construed by the Supreme
Court in the few legislative immunity cases that it has heard,'5 the ex-
isting legislative immunity doctrine indicates that the Framers intended
only to provide immunity for member's legislative tasks.' 6 Critics of this
tradition argue that the concerns over separation of powers and legisla-
tive autonomy that motivated the Framers' broad interpretation of
Speech or Debate Clause immunity supports the application of official
immunity to members' nonlegislative activities.' 7
to that afforded members of Congress through the Speech or Debate Clause. See Spalding
v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 485 (1896) (creating absolute immunity protection for executive
branch officials); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872) (same for judges). Nonetheless,
members of Congress have attempted to apply this form of immunity to their non-legisla-
tive functions. See, e.g., Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1325; Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 316; Brief for
Appellant at 32, Brooks (No. 90-2406) [hereinafter Brooks Brief]; see also Batchelder,
supra note 6, at 401 (advocating official immunity protection for Members of Congress); J.
Timothy McDonald, Note, Do Your Jobs and Get Sued for It!: What the Future Holds for
Representatives, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (same).
11. See infra part I.B. (delineating the scope and development of the official immunity
doctrine).
12. See Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1331; Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328.
13. See infra notes 171-74 (advocating expansion of the legislative immunity doctrine
to include official immunity).
14. See infra note 171 (noting potential ambiguity in the Supreme Court's historical
position that official immunity protection applies only to executive and judicial branch
officials).
15. See supra note 2.
16. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 125-26 (1979) ("'The privilege ... is
restrained to things done in the House in a Parliamentary course .... For [the member] is
not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarium, to exceed the bounds and limits of
his place and duty."' (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 20
(1854), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 704 (S. Padorer ed., 1943) (alterations in original)));
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972); Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 224-25.
17. See Brooks Brief, supra note 10, at 32 n.21; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6,
at 1136-40; Batchelder, supra note 6, at 401.
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Second, do nonlegislative functions merit official immunity protection?
Some scholars note the functional imperative of a member's nonlegisla-
tive duties.'" They contend that because these tasks are within the scope
of members' official duties, common law immunity must protect them.' 9
The courts, however, generally have ruled that legislators have absolute
immunity to make law as prescribed by the Constitution and that the
common law extends only to officials who must enforce or interpret the
law in the absence of explicit constitutional protection.20 According to
this view, the legislative immunity and official immunity doctrines are
mutually exclusive. 2'
Third, should the courts extend the legislative immunity doctrine to ac-
commodate public policy concerns? Critics of the existing legislative im-
munity doctrine would apply the same policies underlying executive/
judicial immunity to members of Congress.22 To do otherwise, they con-
tend, would stymie the vital legislator/constituent relationship and would
result in the executive and judicial branches receiving greater immunity
protection than members of Congress.23 Proponents of the status quo
emphasize the functional differences that implicate distinct policy con-
cerns and accountability to the electorate for legislators on the one hand,
and executive and judicial officials on the other.24 According to this view,
critics overstate the negative impact of withholding official immunity
18. See, e.g., Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 329 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (discussing the func-
tional necessity of protecting members' non-legislative duties with official immunity). Cf.
Dunlap v. Wahlstrom, No. 82-184 (E.D. Ky. July 6, 1983), affd, 783 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984)
(providing congressman and caseworker with official immunity); Adams v. American Bar
Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (extending official immunity to federal offi-
cials including congresspersons). But see Benford v. American Broadcasting Cos., 502 F.
Supp. 1148,'1158 (D. Md. 1980) (order denying motion for summary judgment) (holding
that "[a]bsolute official immunity ... is at most coextensive with the absolute protection
afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause").
19. See supra note 18.
20. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 321; infra notes 217-38 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 217-38.
22. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 332 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (asserting that members'
non-legislative duties "need-no less protection than the tasks performed by the vast ma-
jority of other government officials"); Immunity Hearings, supra note 6, at 7-8 (statement
of Rep. Brooks) ("If I am acting at my peril everytime I send a news release.., or make a
speech ... then wisdom might dictate that I not share that information."); Brooks Brief,
supra note 10, at 37 n.25 (arguing that a denial of official immunity to members "produces
the self-contradicting result that the officials whom the Constitution most explicitly pro-
tects ... receive the least immunity"); Batchelder, supra note 6, at 401-02 (highlighting as
an important policy a members' ability to freely disseminate information to the public);
McDonald, supra note 10, at 1121-23 (positing that the threat of lawsuits implicating mem-
bers' nonlegislative tasks would hamper their efficiency).
23. See Batchelder, supra note 6, at 404.
24. See infra note 270.
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from members' nonlegislative duties.25 The proponents conclude that
these obligations will not be frustrated if members adhere to certain
clearly articulated rules and traditions.26
This Comment addresses these three issues through the context of def-
amation suits against members of Congress. It argues that, based upon
precedent and policy, the doctrine of legislative immunity should remain
confined to that protection provided by the Speech or Debate Clause.
This Comment traces the historical development of legislative immunity
as administered through the Speech or Debate Clause and the varying
limits placed upon that Clause by federal courts. Next, it surveys the de-
velopment of the common law official immunity doctrine through case
law. Further, this Comment examines the case law addressing attempts
to consolidate the two doctrines and forge a middle ground of immunity
between them. It then analyzes the issues raised through attempts to in-
clude official immunity in the legislative immunity doctrine. Arguments
for expanding legislative immunity also are addressed and critically ana-
lyzed. This Comment concludes that, pursuant to the Framers' intentions
regarding the extent of legislative immunity, the constitutionally man-
dated legislative function guiding the Supreme Court's application of the
doctrine, and public policy directives, the Speech or Debate Clause
should continue to be the only immunity protection afforded members of
Congress.
I. THE DOCTRINES OF SPEECH OR DEBATE AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
AND A PROPOSED NExus BETWEEN THEM
A. The Speech or Debate Clause
1. Historical Antecedents
The language of the Speech or Debate Clause is rooted in the English
Bill of Rights.27 Recognition of the need for legislative immunity, how-
ever, reaches back nearly to the beginning of the parliamentary system,
when the Thdor and Stuart monarchs stifled legislators' power by
manipulating the civil and criminal law.28 The British Parliament's efforts
to secure freedom of speech and debate grew out of these royal transgres-
25. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328 ("It is th[e] clear distinction between inherent and
elective duties that disqualifies members of Congress for the grant of official immunity.").
26. See infra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
27. In drafting the Speech or Debate Clause, the Constitution's Framers borrowed
nearly verbatim from the relevant section of the English Bill of Rights, which states: "The
freedom of speech and debates, or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached
or questioned in any court or place out of parliament." 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
28. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
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sions.2 9 Not only were Parliament's deliberative powers at stake,30 but
also its basic legislative powers, which the Crown claimed as its own.3'
Parliament responded to the Crown's attempted usurpation of its powers
by enacting within the Bill of Rights of 1688 provisions to protect its legis-
lative authority from future infringement by the Crown.32 The Framers
added nearly identical language to the United States Constitution in the
Speech or Debate Clause.33
Although the English Bill of Rights and the United States Constitution
include similar speech or debate wording, the Framers recognized inher-
ent differences between the American and English forms of government
that would lead to distinct interpretations of the respective doctrines.34
While the English Parliament sought to preserve its absolute deliberative
and legislative supremacy over the Crown within a balance of powers sys-
tem, the Framers recognized its application to American federalism in a
system of separation of powers. 35
Despite the marked distinctions between the English parliamentary
system and American system of separation of powers, the Framers de-
bated the Speech or Debate Clause only briefly at the Constitutional
Convention.36 Other parliamentary legislative privileges such as immu-
nity from arrest and civil process, the contempt power, and determination
29. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1135.
30. In 1686, King James II prosecuted and fined a member of Parliament, Sir William
Williams, for ordering the publication of deliberations made in the House of Commons
that alleged misconduct by the King and his family. Id at 1130-31 (citing Rex v. Williams,
89 Eng. Rep. 1048 (K.B. 1688)). The King prosecuted Williams based on a restrictive view
of speech immunity, defining it to include only those activities occurring inside the House
of Commons. Id. at 1130. Parliament argued for broader protection, including the publi-
cation of its proceedings. Id. at 1132-33. By manipulating the judges who were to hear the
case, however, King James prevailed. Id. at 1133.
31. In 1688, King James II attempted to suspend ecclesiastical penal laws passed by
Parliament. Id. at 1134. When seven bishops attempted to intervene and petitioned the
King to rescind the order, the King charged them with seditious libel. Id. at 1135 (citing
Case of the Seven Bishops, 12 How. St. T. 183, 377 (1688)). This time, unencumbered by
royal intervention, a jury found the King's actions unconstitutional and the bishop's actions
legitimate. Id.
32. See supra note 27.
33. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
34. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1144.
35. As Chief Justice Burger wrote:
We should bear in mind that the English system differs from ours in that their
Parliament is the supreme authority, not a coordinate branch. Our speech or
debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative independence, not
supremacy. Our task, therefore, is to apply the Clause in such a way as to insure
the independence of the legislature without altering the historic balance of the
three co-equal branches of Government.
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (footnote omitted).
36. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1136.
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of Members' qualifications were heavily debated and significantly cur-
tailed at the Convention.37 The Speech or Debate Clause, on the other
hand, with only its scope at issue, emerged relatively intact.38 The Fram-
ers initially rejected a proposal by William Pinckney to confer upon each
house of Congress the exclusive authority to determine the scope of the
privilege.39 A recommendation by James Madison to define specifically
the parameters of the Clause was similarly tabled.' Although no explicit
reasoning for excluding these suggestions was documented, one might in-
fer from Madison's later statement that "reason and necessity of the priv-
ilege must be the guide,"'" that the Framers intended a broad, functional
scope for the Clause with limits naturally developing through its future
application. 2 The lineage of Speech or Debate Clause cases reflects this
expansive view. As the legislative immunity doctrine has developed, the
Supreme Court has given an increasingly flexible interpretation to what
constitutes legitimate legislative activity worthy of Speech or Debate
Clause protection.
2. The Kilbourn Tradition-Expansive Scope/Limited Interpretation
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause in its
1881 decision, Kilbourn v. Thompson.4 3 At issue in Kilbourn was
whether the House of Representatives possessed the general power 44 to
hold a private citizen in contempt for refusing to cooperate with a con-
gressional investigation.45 The House was investigating a bankrupt real
estate firm that had accrued a large pool of real estate in the District of
Columbia and had as one of its creditors the United States Govern-
ment. 6 Hallett Kilbourn, a member of this firm, was subpoenaed by the
House to testify.47 In the process of the investigation, Kilbourn refused
to cooperate, was cited for contempt by a resolution and vote of the
House, and was taken into custody by the Sergeant-at-Arms.4 Although
the Court found that the House could not itself hold a private citizen in
37. Id. at 1136-37.
38. See id. at 1138; supra note 1 and accompanying text.
39. See Alexander J. Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech
and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future As a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1968).
40. Id. at 15.
41. 4 WRITNGS OF JAMES MADISON 221 (1865).
42. 4 id.
43. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
44. Id. at 181.
45. Id. at 173-74.
46. Id. at 171.
47. Id. at 173.
48. Id. at 174.
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contempt and that it had falsely imprisoned Kilbourn, the Court con-
cluded that the Speech or Debate Clause precluded liability.49
Writing for the Court, Justice Miller stated that the Speech or Debate
Clause must extend to "things generally done in a session of [Congress]
by one of its members in relation to the business before it."5 The Court
emphasized the need to maintain legislative independence in a system of
separate powers and warned that a literal interpretation of the Speech or
Debate Clause would undermine its intent.5 1 The Court concluded that
legislative activities such as voting and writing reports should join a mem-
ber's speech and debate as protected activity. 2 Keeping with English tra-
dition, the Court limited its interpretation to those acts performed within
the walls of the legislature. 3
The Supreme Court did not interpret the Speech or Debate Clause
again until 1951 in Tenney v. Brandhove.14 In Tenney, a witness who had
testified before a committee of the California state legislature attempted
to sue the committee under the Civil Rights Act of 1871." 5 Although
federal construction of the Speech or Debate Clause was not at issue, the
Tenney Court applied the Clause to determine whether the state legisla-
tors had engaged in activity worthy of immunity protection. 6 Specifically
at issue in Tenney were derogatory statements about the plaintiff in the
legislative record. 7 In ruling that the legislators were immune from 1ia-
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 204. Justice Miller did not, however, offer the same protection to the Ser-
geant-at-Arms, John Thompson. Ultimately, Thompson was held liable for Kilbourn's
false imprisonment and had to pay a $20,000 judgment. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 11
D.C. (MacArt. & M.) 401, 432 (D.C. 1883). The Court later expanded the Speech or De-
bate Clause to protect the aides and staff of members of Congress. Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 622 (1972). See generally Mark A. Goldberg, Note, The Speech or
Debate Clause Protection of Congressional Aides, 91 YALE L.J. 961 (1982) (tracing the
development of Speech or Debate Clause immunity as it applies to congressional staffers).
51. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 203.
52. Although the Court had not previously examined the scope of the Speech or De-
bate Clause, the Massachusetts Supreme Court had considered the issue. Coffin v. Coffin,
4 Mass. 1 (1808). Justice Miller's opinion in Kilbourn drew heavily from the Massachusetts
court's opinion by Chief Justice Parsons in Coffin, which stated: "I therefore think that the
article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally .... to [include] the giving of a vote,
to the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in
the execution, of the office ...." Id. at 27.
53. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 202 ("'[W]hatever is done within the walls of either assembly
must pass without question ...."' (quoting Stockdale v. Hansard, 122 Eng. Rep. 1112
(K.B. 1839))).
54. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1988).
56. See Brooks Brief, supra note 10, at 27 n.14.
57. The "Tenney Committee," the Senate Fact-finding Committee on Un-American
Activities, had made allegations about plaintiff Brandhove's criminal record and had re-
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bility, Justice Frankfurter stated that the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity" included discussions in legislative session and inclusions in the
written record. 8 Although the scope of what constituted privileged be-
havior remained broad, the Court's interpretation of "legitimate" activity
remained limited to actions performed in furtherance of a member's leg-
islative role.59
An important legislative immunity case arising in the 1960s was United
States v. Johnson,' in which the Court, for the first time, extended
Speech or Debate Clause immunity to a member's criminal activity.
61
Representative Johnson had delivered a speech on the floor of the House
in return for a bribe. 62 Nonetheless, the Court held his activities immune
under the Speech or Debate Clause.63 Because the prosecution based
its charges upon the motivations behind, and the authorship and content
of the speech itself, liability could not stand.64 Writing for the Court,
Justice Harlan limited this holding to the prosecution of the speech it-
self.65 . He stated that the Government could proceed with the prosecu-
tion if the speech was not imputed to Johnson as a criminal act.' The
Court enunciated as a central tenet of the Speech or Debate Clause, the
foreclosing of executive and judicial inquiry into a member's legislative
motivations.67
futed certain charges that Brandhove had made in a petition circulated among members of
the state legislature. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 371.
58. Id. at 376.
59. See Batchelder, supra note 6, at 389; see also Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66,
74 (3d Cir. 1989) (following the Tenney holding at the state level for legislative committee
chairman's statements made during committee session).
60. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
61. Id. at 184-85.
62. Id. at 170-72.
63. Id. at 184-85.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 185.
66. Id. On remand, the district court dismissed the conspiracy to commit bribery
count, but Johnson was found guilty and convicted on the remaining counts. United States
v. Johnson, 419 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970). Seventeen years
later, the Court had the opportunity to consider this issue again and reached the opposite
result. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501 (1972)).
67. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179 ("The legislative privilege, protecting against possible
prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one mani-
festation of the 'practical security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature.").
In another 1960s case, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), the Court held that
the use of information alleged to have been illegally gathered for a committee investigation
was legitimate legislative activity pursuant to the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 85. The
committee's chief counsel, on the other hand, charged with obtaining the information in
violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, was not protected. Id. The Dom-
browski holding perpetuated the Kilbourn tradition of protecting the legislative activity
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3. Gravel, Brewster and McMillan's Legislative/Political Distinction
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court explored a new means for de-
fining the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. Although the issue re-
mained whether the action in question was within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity, the Court refined the test applied to make that deter-
mination.68 The new test determines whether the member's activity is
"purely legislative, 69 and thus protected, or "political" and thus
unprotected.70
In the defining case of the modem era of Speech or Debate Clause
interpretation, United States v. Brewster,71 the Court again 72 was faced
with a member who had taken a bribe in exchange for performing specific
legislative acts. Pursuant to its ruling in Johnson, the Court held that
Senator Brewster had violated a narrowly drawn bribery statute,73 but
that neither his specific legislative act-voting on postal rate legislation-
nor his motivations for performing that act formed the basis of the prose-
cution against him.74 The Court emphasized that Senator Brewster's ille-
gal conduct was taking the money in exchange for being influenced, not
the legislative act itself.75 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
concluded that immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause is not auto-
matically triggered when a nexus arises between a member's illegal con-
duct and his legislative functions.76 Only where member's specific
legislative acts or motives are questioned is the member immune from
liability.77
Essential to this issue, however, was the distinction the Court drew be-
tween legislative and political activities.78 According to Chief Justice
Burger, the Speech or Debate Clause protects only those activities that
itself but leaving exposed to liability illegal activities facilitated by, or resulting from, the
legislative activity. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
68. The refined test required that the Clause "be read broadly to effectuate its purpose
of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch." Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516.
69. Id. at 512.
70. Id.
71. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
72. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), (g) (1988).
74. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 510.
75. Id. at 526-27.
76. Id. at 516. Chief Justice Burger noted: "[T]here are few activities in which a legis-
lator engages that he would be unable somehow to 'relate' to the legislative process. Ad-
mittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be read broadly ... but no more than the
statutes we apply ...." Id.
77. Id. at 526.
78. Id. at 512.
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are "clearly a part of the legislative process"79-voting for resolutions,
debating on the floor or in a hearing, or compiling and subpoenaing
records for a committee.80 Conversely, the Clause does not protect a
wide range of activities that, although legitimate, are "political in na-
ture"-"'errands' performed for constituents, the making of appoint-
ments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Government
contracts, preparing so-called 'news letters' to constituents, news releases,
and speeches delivered outside the Congress."8'
The Court applied this distinction during the same session in Gravel v.
United States.' At issue in Gravel was the private publication of the
Pentagon Papers by Senator Gravel and a legislative aide. 3 A federal
grand jury was convened to investigate alleged criminal conduct with re-
spect to the public disclosure of these classified documents and promptly
subpoenaed Gravel's aide.' Senator Gravel sought to quash the sub-
poena arguing that the Speech or Debate Clause shielded his aide from
questioning.8" In response, the Court held for the first time that the
Speech or Debate Clause would apply with equal force to members and
their congressional aides and staff.86 Writing for the Court, Justice Black-
mun referred to congressional staff as members' "alter egos" whose serv-
ices are critical to members' functions amidst a burgeoning workload.87
The Court concluded, however, that the private publication was not pro-
tected speech or debate and that, to the extent that the grand jury investi-
gation related to that publication, Senator Gravel's aide was not
protected by the Clause. 8 Justice Blackmun explained that these conclu-
79. Id. at 516.
80. Id. at 516 n.10.
81. Id. at 512.
82. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
83. The Pentagon Papers was the popular name for a classified Defense Department
study entitled History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.
Id. at 608-09. Senator Gravel introduced and inserted into the public record the entire
forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon Papers at a meeting of the Senate Subcommittee on
Public Buildings and Grounds. Id. at 609.
84. Id. at 608.
85. Id. at 608-09.
86. Id. at 621.
87. Id. at 617. Justice Blackmun concluded that "if [aides] are not so recognized, the
central role of the Speech or Debate Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the
Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary-will inevitably be dimin-
ished and frustrated." Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966)).
The Gravel decision represents the Court's recognition of the growing complexity of
government service and the resulting delegations of official authority from officers of
higher rank to those of lower rank. Expansion of the legislative immunity doctrine in
Gravel closely resembled the Court's interpretation of executive immunity. See infra notes
135-50 and accompanying text.
88. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:535
sions were dictated by the Court's previous holdings in Dombrowski v.
Eastland 9 and Kilbourn.9 According to these precedents, even if the
illegal activities of a legislative aide facilitate or result from an immune
legislative act, they will not be protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause. 91
Applying the Brewster Court's legislative/political distinction, Justice
Blackmun defined legitimate legislative activity as those matters integral
to the delibeiative and communicative processes that relate to the consid-
eration and passage of legislation.92 In his view, private publication of
the Pentagon Papers was not essential to the deliberations of the Senate
or the passage of legislation.93 Conversely, committee perusal and inclu-
sion in the record of the same materials was essential and protected.94
The Court came to a similar conclusion in Doe v. McMillan.95 The
controversy in McMillan arose after members and staff of a house com-
mittee issued a report96 containing disparaging information about specific
District of Columbia public school students.97 In response to an invasion
of privacy suit brought against the members and staff, the Court con-
cluded that inclusion of the offensive material in the Committee report
was protected legislative activity under the Speech or Debate Clause. 98
Distribution of the report, however, was not protected.9 Consequently,
89. 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).
90. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 620-21; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
91. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617-18. It is important to note that in Kilbourn, Dombrowski,
and Gravel, the members of Congress were not themselves implicated in the actual crimi-
nal conduct that rendered their aides liable. Justice Blackmun noted in Gravel, however,
that if a member were so incriminated in the future, he would be subject to liability. Id. at
619.
92. Id. at 625.
93. Id.
94. Id. Members of Congress strongly rejected the Brewster and Gravel decisions, and
responded by forming the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations to evaluate what
they felt should be the proper scope of legislative immunity for members. The Committee
concluded that Speech or Debate Clause immunity should include "any activities under-
taken within the legislative branch in fulfilling the role of the Congress in the constitution-
ally defined government of coordinate and coequal branches." Joint Committee on
Congressional Operations on the Legislative Role of Congress in Gathering and Disclosing
Information, The Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress, S. REP. No. 896, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 53 (1974). They argued that anything a member does to represent the
interests of his or her constituents must be protected. Id.
95. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
96. H.R. REP. No. 1681, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
97. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 308-09.
98. Id. at 317-18.
99. Id. at 324.
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the Superintendent of Documents and Public Printer in charge of distrib-
uting the committee report were subject to suit.10°
The Court also rejected an attempt by the Superintendent of Docu-
ments and the Public Printer to raise a common law official immunity
defense. 101 Writing for the Court, Justice White noted that the printing
office was independent of any other branch of government with no speci-
fied statutory or common law immunity attached to it."°  Therefore, to
the extent that the printing office was working for the legislature, it could
only claim that form of immunity protection afforded to the legisla-
ture.1°3 Similarly, if the Printer had printed actionable materials for the
executive branch, the Court would have protected its actions only to the
extent that the official immunity doctrine protected executive officials.' °4
This latter conclusion by Justice White appears to foreclose the applica-
tion of extra-constitutional immunity via the doctrine of official immunity
to members of Congress and poses an obstacle to those scholars who
would apply official immunity to members defending defamation suits. 0 5
4. Defamation: Defining the Modern Era
The Brewster, Gravel, and McMillan holdings are critical in their appli-
cation to defamation suits against members of Congress, which have
dominated the modem era of legislative immunity jurisprudence in the
federal courts. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,"° Senator Proxmire instituted
a "'Golden Fleece of the Month Award"' in an attempt to spotlight
wasteful government spending."° He had privately published disparag-
ing remarks about an award recipient," ° who in turn sued Senator
Proxmire for libel."° In refusing to extend Speech or Debate Clause im-
munity to Senator Proxmire, the Court reaffirmed its holdings in Gravel
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 323.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
105. See Williams v. Brooks, 945 F.2d 1322, 1328-29 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the
McMillan holding precludes official immunity for members' nonlegislative actions), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992). But see McMillan, 412 U.S. at 319 n.13 ("Both before and
after Barr v. Matteo, official immunity has been held applicable to officials of the Legisla-
tive Branch.").
106. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
107. Id. at 114.
108. The award went to three federal agencies that had funded research into why
monkeys clench their jaws under stress and to Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral research
scientist who conducted the research and ultimately brought the suit against Senator
Proxmire. Id. at 114-15.
109. Id.
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and McMillan that private publication of actionable materials is not activ-
ity essential to the legislative deliberations of the Senate. 110 Again, the
Court emphasized that "purely legislative" activities would include de-
famatory statements made on the Senate floor, in a committee hearing, or
in a committee report, but not in constituent newsletters, news releases,
or speeches delivered outside Congress. 1'
At present, members of Congress are afforded only that immunity pro-
vided in the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. 2 for their leg-
islative activities. 1 3 In narrowly tailoring the Clause, the Court claimed
to adhere to the spirit of Article I and beliefs of the Framers, 114 despite
110. Id. at 130-31.
111. Id. The Court also noted that a member's "libelous remarks in the follow up tele-
phone calls to executive agencies and in the television and radio interviews are not pro-
tected." Id. at 121 n.10.
112. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324 (1973).
113. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). Litigants recently have raised
Speech or Debate Clause immunity in response to unlawful discharge suits brought by
congressional employees against members of Congress. The circuit courts generally have
held that members will receive Speech or Debate Clause immunity only if the discharged
employee's "duties ... 'significantly inform[ ] or influence[ ] the shaping of our nation's
laws." Browning v. Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir.)
(upholding dismissal of unlawful discharge suit brought by House Official Reporter, whose
duties were directly related to the legislative process (quoting Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d
923, 931 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984)) (holding that the duties of the
House restaurant manager did not implicate Speech or Debate Clause concerns and thus
her discharge fell outside its protective scope)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 996 (1986). Other
recent litigation involving interpretation of the clause has arisen in the federal courts. See
United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying constitutional chal-
lenge to a member's Travel Act conviction based on his argument that because he con-
ducted legislative activity while travelling the Speech or Debate Clause protected his illegal
conduct), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); Agromayor v. Colberg, 738 F.2d 55, 60 (1st
Cir.) (applying the Walker test in state legislative context), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037
(1984); compare United States v. Durenberger, No. CR3-93-65, slip op. at 3 (D. Neb. Dec.
3, 1993) (order granting motion to dismiss) (holding that member's submissions of third
party affidavits to Senate Ethics Committee constituted protected legislative activity under
the Speech or Debate Clause and that their subsequent use in Grand Jury proceedings was
unconstitutional) with United States v. Rose, 790 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D.D.C. 1992) (order
denying motion to dismiss) (rejecting member's contention-supported by an amicus cu-
riae brief filed by a House bipartisan leadership group-that the Speech or Debate Clause
protects from executive branch investigation statements revealed in House Ethics Commit-
tee made on financial disclosure reports as mandated by the Ethics in Government Act);
and compare United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1546 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits an inquiry into member's committee status where
the purpose for introducing that status was to draw inferences about member's legislative
acts) with United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (order deny-
ing motion to dismiss) (distinguishing Swindall and holding that a Grand Jury indictment
citing member's committee status did not violate the Speech or Debate Clause where that
status was introduced to explain alleged criminal acts of others, not the members legislative
acts).
114. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 126-29.
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critics' assertions that official immunity should extend to members' non-
legislative, political duties.'15
B. Official Immunity
Although the Constitution provides absolute immunity to members of
Congress," 6 it offers little protection to executive or judicial acts. 117
Therefore, the Supreme Court has developed an extra-constitutional
body of immunity law to provide officials in the executive and judicial
branches with absolute immunity from civil suits." 8 Pursuant to this doc-
trine, the specific functions of the executive or judicial official determine
the protection afforded." 9 In making this determination, the Court will
analyze whether the suit deters or distracts an official from his proper
functions or unfairly challenges his decisions. 20
1. Judicial Privilege
In 1871, the Supreme Court first considered official immunity for fed-
eral judges in Bradley v. Fisher.'2 ' Bradley involved a suit against a fed-
eral trial judge for disbarring the attorney who represented John Wilkes
Booth's attending physician after Abraham Lincoln's assassination. 122
The Court denied this claim, holding that all federal judges were entitled
to absolute immunity for their judicial acts.' 23 Concerned that judicial
discretion and independence remain unencumbered, Justice Field, writing
115. See infra notes 171-73; see also Alexander J. Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative
Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative Coequality,
8 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1019, 1040-47 (1974) (suggesting that restrictive holdings in Speech
or Debate Clause cases have led to a fundamental misconception of the legislative process
by the Supreme Court).
116. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.
117. The Supreme Court has provided the President with absolute immunity from civil
damages in suits challenging his official acts. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-56
(1982).
118. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501-02 (1978).
119. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
120. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that although
falsely incarcerating plaintiff was regrettable, his arrest by Justice Department officials was
within the scope of their duties and thus absolutely protected), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950); Mayer G. Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An
Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 526, 529-30 (1977) (suggesting a policy ration-
ale behind construction of the official immunity doctrine); Edward G. Jennings, Tort Lia-
bility of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 271-72 (1937) (listing justifications
for and policy behind absolute immunity protection for judicial officials).
121. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
122. Id. at 344; see also Louis J. WEICHMANN, A TRuE HISTORY OF THE ASSASSINA-
TION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND OF THE CONSPIRACY OF 1865 354-79 (Floyd E. Risvold
ed., 1975) (discussing the belligerence of the physician's attorney at trial).
123. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
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for the Court, stated that a judge must be "free to act upon his own con-
victions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.' 12 4
After Bradley, the scope of judicial immunity protection was enlarged
considerably. Similar to the immunity provided to executive officials,"z
federal courts now apply a functional approach to judicial immunity.' 26
Under this functional approach, the reviewing court first will consider the
range of responsibilities entrusted to an official or class of officials whose
actions have been challenged in a lawsuit. 27 Courts then will analyze the
effect that exposure to liability will have on those official duties. 28
Given the ease with which a citizen unhappy with a particular ruling
could question judicial motives, this inquiry becomes essential to preserv-
ing judicial discretion.' 29
The functional approach has expanded judicial immunity both in terms
of the classes of officials who are shielded from liability and the official
activities that are protected. For instance, courts have extended the judi-
cial immunity doctrine to "quasi-judicial" officials, including prosecu-
tors 30 and grand jurors.' 3' Likewise, the Supreme Court has applied the
immunity doctrine to activities beyond an official's core responsibilities,
such as a judge's administrative employment decisions 32 or a judge's leg-
islative action in implementing and later enforcing a code of conduct for
lawyers. 33 Federal courts likewise have followed this expansive trend. 34
124. Id. Judges will retain absolute immunity even if their actions are malicious, cor-
rupt, or in excess of authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (citing
Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351). Only if a judge acts in the "'clear absence of all juris-
diction"' will he be exposed to liability. Id. at 357 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
351).
125. See infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (explaining that under the
"functional" approach, courts will examine the effect that exposure to liability will have
upon the lawfully entrusted functions of a given official).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing the predict-
ability of civil suits against judicial officials that justifies absolute immunity protection),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988); Freed, supra note 120, at 530 (same).
130. See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), affd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503
(1927).
131. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,423 n.20 (1976); see also Sundquist, 833 F.2d
at 315 ("The immunity was made absolute because of the predictable prospect that individ-
uals subject to a judge, prosecutor, or grand juror's unfavorable decision would bring suit
and no lesser protection would suffice.").
132. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 219.
133. Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 739 (1980).
134. See, e.g., Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir.) (extending immunity to
judge who allegedly provided false information to his clerks regarding plaintiff's special
verdict conference), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982, 985
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2. Executive Immunity
The various levels of delegated authority and official responsibility in
the executive branch have complicated the application of the common
law immunity doctrine to the executive branch. Nonetheless, the doc-
trine currently immunizes a vast array of public official functions.
135
The Supreme Court first extended absolute immunity to executive de-
partment heads in Spalding v. Vilas.'3 6 In Spalding, the Court denied a
defamation claim against the Postmaster General who allegedly distrib-
uted divisive information about the petitioner to other postmasters.
37
Adopting the Bradley Court's policy analysis, 38 the Spalding Court held
that an executive department head should not function under the appre-
hension that his motives will be called into question.' 39 Although the
communications in Spalding were not circulated to the general public,
federal courts subsequently provided absolute protection to communica-
tions by department heads that were publicly disseminated."*
The doctrine of official immunity currently protects all executive offi-
cials from civil suits challenging their duties and responsibilities. This
modern doctrine evolved from the landmark executive immunity case,
Barr v. Matteo.'4 ' Barr involved a libel suit brought against the acting
director of the Office of Rent Stabilization for an alleged libel contained
in a press release issued by the Office.' 42 In rejecting the claim, Justice
(5th Cir. 1980) (extending immunity "for clerks of court acting in a nonroutine manner
under command of court decrees or under explicit instructions of a judge"); Atcherson v.
Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063-67 (8th Cir. 1979) (protecting a judge functioning in an
administrative capacity). But see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2616-18 (1993)
(holding that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity from suit for manufactur-
ing false evidence used to establish probable cause or for making false statements while
announcing an indictment at a press conference); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 n.7
(4th Cir. 1972) ("When a judge acts in a non-judicial capacity he pro tanto loses his abso-
lute immunity and is subject to liability as any other state official.").
135. See infra note 150.
136. 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
137. Id. at 485.
138. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
139. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-99.
140. See, e.g., Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273, 281 (D.C. Cir.) (holding the Secretary of
Interior immune from liability for an alleged libel contained in a press release), cert. de-
nied, 311 U.S. 718 (1940); Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168, 172 (D.C. Cir.) (holding the
Secretary of Treasury immune from liability where he sent a letter containing an alleged
libel to the President and the press), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927). This form of immu-
nity was later qualified to protect only those communications which related to the official's
duties and functions. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (1959).
141. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
142. Id. at 565. Joining attacks made by members of Congress, the acting director pub-
licly criticized subordinate officers in the Office of Rent Stabilization for implementing a
controversial budgetary plan within the office. Id. at 567-68.
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Harlan stated that the director's statements were "within the outer perim-
eter of [the official's] line of duty." 143 He then announced two principles
that would guide questions of executive official immunity in the future.
First, he reiterated the importance of executive immunity protection, 1"
emphasizing an official's need to be free from fear of damage suits that
would otherwise impinge upon her time, energy, and the effective admin-
istration of governmental policies. 145 Second, Justice Harlan discussed
the importance of taking a functional approach to the application of exec-
utive official immunity."4 He admitted that department heads merit
broader protection than subordinate officers with less responsibility. 47
He concluded, however, that it is precisely these duties, not the office
title, that dictate the breadth of immunity applicable to an officer whose
official actions have been called into question.1 48 The circuit courts have
widely applied the functional approach1 49 to protect an array of
officials.150
143. Id. at 575.
144. Id. at 571.
145. Id. The words of Judge Learned Hand formed the basis of Justice Harlan's policy
argument: "[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a
trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." Gre-
goire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (cited in Barr, 360 U.S. at 571), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
146. Barr, 360 U.S. at 572-73.
147. Id. at 573 ("But that is because the higher the post, the broader the range of re-
sponsibilities and duties, and the wider the scope of discretion, it entails.")
148. Id. at 573-74.
149. Circuit courts have given the Barr doctrine an expansive reading, ruling that "it is
only necessary that the action [of the federal official] bear some reasonable relation to and
connection with the duties and responsibilities of the official." Scherer v. Brennan, 379
F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); see also Currie v. Guthrie, 749
F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a civilian supervisor in a U.S. Naval office was
within the outer periphery of her duty and thus immune from liability when she signed an
affidavit charging a subordinate with disturbance of the peace). It is this form of immunity
that members of Congress argue should be applied to them. See infra note 173 and accom-
panying text.
The Supreme Court also has provided a qualified immunity to executive officials for
suits alleging constitutional or statutory violations. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-
08 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). According to this doctrine, if an
executive branch official has reasonable grounds to believe that his or her conduct did not
violate a constitutional or statutory provision, immunity will extend to the conduct. Id.
150. See, e.g., Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1063-64 (11th Cir.
1992) (county commissioners); Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1290
(10th Cir. 1989) (police officers); Williamson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368,
383 (5th Cir. 1987) (Farmers Home Administration officials); George v. Kay, 632 F.2d
1103, 1106 (4th Cir. 1980) (postal inspector), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Allred v.
Svarczkopf, 573 F.2d 1146, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 1978) (dog catcher); Expeditions Unlimited
Aquatic Enters. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Smith-
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C. Attempts to Apply Official Immunity to Members of Congress
Two recent federal circuit court cases, Chastain v. Sundquist 5' and
Williams v. Brooks,' 52 represent attempts by members of Congress to ap-
ply the official immunity doctrine to defamation claims filed against
them. In both cases, the circuit courts restricted the scope and applica-
tion of legislative immunity protection to the Speech or Debate Clause
and refused to extend official immunity to the members. 5 3 Likewise, the
Supreme Court denied Representative Sundquist's' 54 and Representative
Brooks"155 petitions for writ of certiorari.
Both cases involved common law tort claims alleged by private citi-
zens.156 Representative Sundquist printed allegedly libelous remarks in a
two-page letter distributed to the Attorney General and released to the
media.' 7 Representative Brooks made allegedly defamatory statements
in a television interview. 158 In Sundquist, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a trial court decision
that had extended official immunity protection to the Congressman.'
5 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Brooks af-
firmed the district court's denial of Congressman Brooks' motion to dis-
miss on grounds of official immunity."6
.The Sundquist court determined that the communication in question
was not a "purely legislative activit[y]' 161 and was thus outside the scope
of Speech or Debate Clause immunity. 62 In denying that official immu-
nity protection exists for members of Congress, the court distinguished
between a member's constitutional responsibilities and those voluntarily
assumed. 6 3 With the former, the court stated that all of a member's con-
sonian department chairman), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Scherer v. Brennan, 379
F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir.) (U.S. reasury officers), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); Ove
Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1962) (contracting of-
ficers), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963).
151. 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
152. 945 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992).
153. Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1330-31; Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328.
154. Sundquist v. Chastain, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
155. Brooks v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992).
156. Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1324; Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 312-13.
157. Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 312-13.
158. Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1323-24.
159. Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328.
160. Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1330-31.
161. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). Note also that in Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), the Court held that communications designed to influ-
ence executive branch decisions are not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at
121 n.10.
162. Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328.
163. Id.
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stitutional responsibilities will receive Speech or Debate Clause protec-
tion."6 For the latter, a member's "elective" duties will be afforded
neither Speech or Debate nor official immunity protection. 65
The Brooks court regarded the scope of legislative official immunity as
"coextensive" with that provided in the Speech or Debate Clause. 6 6
Although the court alluded to the separate application of the official im-
munity doctrine to members of Congress in rulings of other courts' 67 and
in Supreme Court dictum,168 it concluded that the scope of the Speech or
Debate Clause was conclusive in determining immunity protection for
members of Congress. 69
The present status of legislative immunity, that members of Congress
are protected only by Speech or Debate Clause immunity, would appear
164. Id.
165. Id. In support of its distinction between what should remain immune behavior and
what should not, the court deferred to the words of James Madison:
"[A]II laws should be made to operate as much on the law makers as upon the
people; the greatest security for the preservation of liberty, is for the government
to have a sympathy with those on whom the laws act, and a real participation and
communication of all their burthens and grievances. Whenever it is necessary to
exempt any part of the government from sharing in these common burthens, that
necessity ought not only to be palpable, but should on no account be exceeded."
Id. (quoting James Madison, The Militia Bill, House of Representatives (Dec. 16, 1790),
reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrITTON 331 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987)).
166. Williams v. Brooks, 945 F.2d 1322, 1329 n.6 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1996 (1992).
167. The court referred to 14 circuit court cases cited in Congressman Brooks's brief,
which allegedly applied the official immunity doctrine to congressmen. Id. at 1330 (citing
Brooks Brief, supra note 10, at 27). The court concluded, however, that only two of these
cases (both unreported) specifically held that congressmen were entitled to official immu-
nity. Id. at 1330 (citing Dunlap v. Wahlstrom, No. 82-184 (E.D. Ky. July 6, 1983) (ruling
that a congressman was entitled to official immunity), affd, 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984);
Adams v. American Bar Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 219, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that cabinet
officers, congressmen, and other federal officials are entitled to official immunity)). Fur-
thermore, one of the 14 aforementioned cases restricted absolute legislative immunity to
the application and protective scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 1330 (citing
Benford v. American Broadcasting Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1148, 1158 (D. Md. 1980) (order
denying motion for summary judgment).
168. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319 n.13 (1973); infra note 171.
169. Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1331. Deferring to two federal circuits in support of this con-
clusion, the court first refuted Congressman Brooks's argument that the Fifth Circuit rec-
ognizes official immunity coverage for congressmen, by quoting that circuit: "'The
inapplicability of speech or debate protection ... foreclose[s] [a member] from asserting an
absolute official immunity.... Speech or Debate protection is coextensive with the need to
afford members of Congress absolute immunity."' Id. at 1329 (quoting Davis v. Passman,
544 F.2d 865, 881 (5th Cir. 1977)). Second, the court upheld Sundquist's conclusion that
congressmen are limited to Speech or Debate immunity under the Constitution. Id. at
1330 (citing Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1240 (1988)).
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explicit in the rulings of the Sundquist and Brooks courts and implicit in
the Supreme Court's refusal to pass on the argument. 170 The Supreme
Court's analysis in this regard, however, is not without ambiguity.17' Fur-
thermore, predominant commentary on the issue urges expansion of leg-
islative immunity to include Barr-type, official immunity protection. 72
Likewise, members of Congress have intervened in several cases attempt-
ing to revise the status quo. 73 Whether the Supreme Court's lack of clar-
ity on the issue and the external pressure from commentators and
members of Congress will alter the course of legislative immunity is pres-
ently unclear. The balance of this Comment addresses these various ar-
guments and concludes that altering the present scope of legislative
immunity would betray the Framers' intentions, undermine the Speech or
Debate Clause and improperly expand the constitutional authority of
members of Congress.
II. AN UNNECESSARY INTRUSION INTO SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Past critics of the scope of legislative immunity advocated expansion of
the Speech or Debate Clause to include protection of a legislator's con-
170. See Brooks v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992). Justices White, Blackmun, and
O'Connor voted to grant certiorari in Sundquist. Sundquist v. Chastain, 487 U.S. 1240
(1988).
171. The Supreme Court articulated a position contrary to the conclusions of Sundquist
and Brooks in an isolated footnote in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973): "Both before
and after Barr, official immunity has been held applicable to officials of the Legislative
Branch." Id. at 319 n.13. In advocating the extension of official immunity to members of
Congress in his dissenting opinion in Sundquist, Judge Mikva nevertheless noted the ambi-
guity and lack of reliability of the McMillan footnote. Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 331 (Mikva
J., dissenting) ("Because it is impossible to discern the precise meaning the Court intended
this statement to carry, it cannot be relied upon with great confidence.").
172. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1113; Batchelder, supra note 6, at 403;
McDonald, supra note 10, at 1109; supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text (discussing
the functional approach undertaken by the Barr v. Matteo Court for evaluating issues of
executive immunity protection). Cf. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An
Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REv. 175, 184-88 (1973) (advocating an
expansion of the Speech or Debate Clause itself to protect a member's non-legislative
functions).
173. Following the Sundquist decision, the House of Representatives adopted a privi-
leged resolution urging the Supreme Court to grant Congressman Sundquist's writ of certi-
orari. H.R. Res. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 10,579 (1988). The resolution
stated that "the decision of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals, if left standing, will
have an adverse effect on the performance of important official duties by Members of the
House and will deprive citizens of an irreplaceable source of information about the func-
tioning of their government." Id. The Supreme Court nonetheless denied Congressman
Sundquist's petition. Sundquist v. Chastain, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
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duct not regarded as "purely legislative."' 74 Recently, however, critics
largely have abandoned that argument. 175 In its place, the official immu-
nity doctrine has emerged as a potential vehicle for protecting members'
burgeoning "political" responsibilities, 76 that historically have gone un-
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 7 7
A. The Framers' Intent
1. The Cabell Grand Jury Investigation and Resulting Protest
Critics of the current legislative immunity doctrine argue that the
Framers' vision of an independent legislature commands extension of the
official immunity doctrine to members of Congress.' 78 In support of their
argument, commentators often will refer to the Framers' responses to the
1797 grand jury investigation of Congressman Cabell of Virginia. 79 Con-
gressman Cabell and other anti-Federalist members of Congress had sent
174. The most focused criticism arose in reaction to the Supreme Court's holdings in
the Gravel and Brewster cases. According to critics, these cases represented a betrayal of
the legislative independence envisioned by the Framers and undermined legislative author-
ity in a system of separation of powers. See, e.g., Brief for the Senate of the United States
at 6, United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (No. 71-1026), reprinted in Immunity
Hearings, supra note 6, at 94; Ervin, supra note 172, at 177; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra
note 6, at 1177. The Senate called for expansion of the traditional scope of the Speech or
Debate Clause to meet contemporary demands placed on members of Congress. Reinstein
& Silverglate, supra note 6, at 37. According to these views, Gravel frustrated the congres-
sional informing function, while Brewster frustrated the immunity from executive and judi-
cial questioning of a member's legislative motives.
As discussed below with respect to the argument that official immunity should extend to
members of Congress, the aforementioned arguments contravene the Framers' intent for
the scope of legislative immunity protection, the constitutionally mandated legislative func-
tion that the Supreme Court has decided dictates that scope and the important policy con-
cerns behind the disparate immunity treatment of executive and judicial officials on the
one hand and members of Congress on the other. See infra parts II.A.-B.
175. Attorneys representing members of Congress in suits filed against them have ad-
mitted that the scope of Speech or Debate Clause immunity is limited to protecting only
"purely legislative" activity as suggested by the Brewster and Gravel courts. See, e.g.,
Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 313; Brooks Brief, supra note 10, at 25.
176. See supra text accompanying note 81.
177. See supra note 10.
178. See, e.g., 134 CONo. REc. 10,576 (1988) (statement of Rep. Michel) (suggesting
that the Framers acknowledged the official immunity doctrine when constructing the
Speech or Debate Clause); Brooks Brief, supra note 10, at 36 n.23 (stating that Framers
recognized the "need to freely allow Members' communications to constituents"); Batchel-
der, supra note 6, at 386 (noting that the Framers envisioned legislative immunity "as a
bulwark against judicial and executive encroachment on the independence of Congress");
McDonald, supra note 10, at 1125 (suggesting that because the Framers-vis-&-vis the
Speech or Debate Clause-intended the most immunity protection for members, their in-
creased nonlegislative functions deserve heightened protection via official immunity).
179. See 134 CONG. REc. 10,577 (1988) (statement of Rep. Hyde); Reinstein & Silver-
glate, supra note 6, at 1140-41; Batchelder, supra note 6, at 387 n.23.
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newsletters to their constituents condemning the policies of President
John Adams with respect to the war in France after the French Revolu-
tion.18 0 In response, the Adams Administration ordered a grand jury
investigation of these allegedly "seditious" newsletters.18' The grand
jury in turn handed down indictments against Cabell and the other
congressmen. 182
The grand jury indictments drew a vicious reaction.183 In their famous
protest to the Virginia House of Delegates, Thomas Jefferson, Adams's
Vice President, and James Madison denounced the executive and judicial
branches for blatantly violating separation of powers principles and im-
pinging upon legislative authority."8 Jefferson and Madison 8 5 warned
of the dangerous consequences that would result if the executive and ju-
diciary were permitted to hinder member-constituent communications. 86
2. Contemporary Adaptation of the "Protest"?
Members of Congress and some legal commentators argue that the
principles articulated by Jefferson and Madison should guide the federal
courts in applying the official immunity doctrine to members of Con-
180. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1140-41 (citing 8 WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 325 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) [hereinafter WORKS OF JEFFERSON]).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1141-42 (citing 8 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 180, at 322-23, 325-27).
184. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison wrote:
[I]n order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought to have, and the
information which may enable them to exercise it usefully, it was a part of the
common law, adopted as the law of this land, that their representatives, in the
discharge of their functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the
co-ordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive; and that their communications
with their constituents should of right, as of duty also, be free, full, and unawed by
any ....
Thomas Jefferson (and James Madison), Protest to the Virginia House of Delegates (1797),
reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrruriON 336 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) [hereinafter Protest to the Virginia House].
185. Although Thomas Jefferson authored the "Protest," Madison joined in its drafting
and offered several minor changes. For instance, Madison suggested that: "It is certainly of
great importance to set the public opinion right with regard to the functions of grand juries,
and the dangerous abuses of them in the federal courts; nor could a better occasion occur."
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1142 n.153.
186. Jefferson and Madison wrote: "[Flor the Judiciary to interpose in the legislative
department between the constituent and his representative, to control them in the exercise
of their functions or duties towards each other ... is to put the legislative department
under the feet of the Judiciary.. . ." Protest to the Virginia House, supra note 184, at 336.
Jefferson and Madison also called for the arrest and imprisonment of the grand jurors,
which resulted in a quick termination of the investigation. Id.
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gress.1' According to this view, private civil actions against members of
Congress threaten member-constituent communications in a way similar
to the threat posed by the grand jury indictments in the Cabell inci-
dent. 18 The argument concludes that extension of the extra-constitu-
tional immunity doctrine to members defending such suits would fulfill
the Framers' mandate. 189
Two problems arise when commentators attempt to apply the Framers'
concerns raised in the Cabell case to the modem context of libel suits
against members of Congress. First, modern commentators would apply
Jefferson's and Madison's argument, which effectively defended long-
held Speech or Debate Clause principles,"g to the official immunity doc-
trine historically applied only to the executive and judicial branches.' 9 '
The two doctrines are quite different."9 The Speech or Debate Clause
was included in the Constitution to protect the legislative independence
of members from civil or criminal suits brought either by the other
branches of government or by private citizens. 193 These elements are
well depicted in the Cabell protest that arose from attempts by the execu-
tive to bring a criminal suit against members for their constituent commu-
nications. 94 The official immunity doctrine, on the other hand, neither
arises from the text of the Constitution nor applies to criminal suits
brought by the other branches of government. 195 On the contrary, this
doctrine was judicially created to provide absolute immunity from private
civil suits and qualified protection from statutory and constitutional suits
to executive and judicial officials who were not otherwise provided with
explicit protection in the Constitution.196 Speech or Debate Clause im-
munity can scarcely be grafted upon the official immunity doctrine when
contrasting origins and applications of these doctrines are construed. 97
187. See 134 CONG. REC. 10,577 (1988) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("I know of few ob-
servations so prophetic as Jefferson's, when he says that constituent [communications] are
'the substance of representation."'); Batchelder, supra note 6, at 387 n.23 (quoting Jeffer-
son and Madison's "Protest").
188. 134 CONG. REC. 10,577 (1988) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
189. Id. Cf Immunity Hearings, supra note 6, at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Brooks) (not-
ing the danger of restricting member/constituent communications).
190. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1141 ("The significance of [Jefferson
and Madison's] eloquent protest goes beyond even the stature of its authors; it is a cogent
analysis of the purposes and scope of the speech or debate clause ... .
191. See supra Part I.B.
192. See Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Mikva, J., dissent-
ing) (outlining differences between the two doctrines), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
193. See supra note 35.
194. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 192.
196. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 330 (Mikva, J., dissenting); supra Part I.B.
197. Compare supra part I.A. with supra part I.B.
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Second, the Speech or Debate Clause implicates distinct separation of
powers concerns; the official immunity doctrine does not.' 98 Nonethe-
less, some argue that the same separation of powers and member-constit-
uent precepts that characterized the Cabell protest' 99 should apply in the
context of a published libel. 2" Certainly, grand jury investigations into
the circulation of a member's critique of an executive branch policy impli-
cate a violation of separation of powers and encroachment upon legisla-
tive authority.20 ' The same cannot be said of an inquiry into a member's
press releases designed to malign a private individual. On the contrary,
exposing such communications to liability neither denies "the will of the
people the influence it ought to have" nor exposes the legislature to "co-
ercion of the co-ordinate branches."2 ' 2 Consequently, the Framers, the
English Parliament before them, and the Supreme Court specifically have
excluded private publications of libelous statements by members from
Speech or Debate Clause protection.20 3 Because it is within the context
of private tort suits against members of Congress that some would pro-
198. See supra notes 35 and 192.
199. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
200. Related arguments arose generally in the wake of the Sundquist decision. H.R.
Res. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 10,574 (1988); id. at 10,574-79 (statements
of Reps. Foley, Michel, Gejdenson, Hyde, Ford, Cheney, Schumer, McCollum, Hughes,
and Lott); Batchelder, supra note 6, at 384; McDonald, supra note 10, at 1109.
201. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
202. Protest to the Virginia House, supra note 184, at 336-37. The Sundquist court em-
phasized that "[n]o barrier" limits a member's ability to communicate with his constituents
except that he may not, in a non-legislative capacity, libel others with impunity. Sundquist,
833 F.2d at 323.
203. See Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1156 (Q.B. 1839); see also Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1881). The Court has refused to deviate from this histori-
cal tradition. It continually has excluded from legislative immunity protection the private
publication of libelous or otherwise actionable information, which, if exposed in a "purely
legislative" context, would have been absolutely immune from suit. See, e.g., Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1979); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
The words of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison likewise are indicative of the Fram-
ers' intentions in this regard. Both noted the importance of holding members accountable
to the same degree that private citizens would so hold themselves: "[Tihe substance of
representation,. . . requires essentially that the representative be as free as his constituents
would be, that the same interchange of sentiment be lawful between him and them as
would be lawful among themselves were they in the personal transaction of their own busi-
ness ... ." Protest to the Virginia Legislature, supra note 184, at 336.
The Supreme Court has held private citizens liable in defamation actions for falsely at-
tacking other citizens. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990)
(holding that a statement must contain provable false fact for liability to attach); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (affirming defend-
ant's liability for defamation without a showing of "actual malice"). Consistent with Jeffer-
son's and Madison's observations above, members of Congress should be held liable in
defamation actions.
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spectively apply the Framers' views, precedent and policy mandate that
this application fail.
B. Applying The Official Immunity Doctrine to Legislators
1. Dual Application of Speech or Debate and Official Immunity:
The Functional Approach
Some members of Congress and commentators argue that the distinct
protections of the Speech or Debate Clause and the official immunity
doctrine both should apply to the diverse functions of legislators. 2" Ac-
cording to this view, the Speech or Debate Clause would provide abso-
lute protection from all civil or criminal proceedings challenging a
member's purely legislative activities.2"5 The official immunity doctrine,
on the other hand, would provide absolute protection from private civil
suits implicating a member's nonlegislative duties.2" Although propo-
nents of this argument recognize that the Supreme Court has never
applied official immunity to members of Congress, 20 7 nevertheless, they
assert that because members' official functions include so many nonlegis-
lative duties,208 occupying the bulk of their time,209 these activities neces-
A leading constitutional scholar, Justice Joseph Story succinctly addressed a member's
liability for defamation and the Framer's intent:
No man ought to have a right to defame others under colour of a performance of
the duties of his office. And if he does so in the actual discharge of his duties in
congress, that furnishes no reason, why he should be enabled through the medium
of the press to destroy the reputation ... of other citizens. It is neither within the
scope of his duty, nor in furtherance of public rights, or public policy.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTIruTION OF THE UNITED STATES 309
(photo. reprint 1987) (1833).
204. See supra note 200.
205. Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 330 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id. The same proponents would argue that the Court also has neither explicitly
nor implicitly denied the application of official immunity to members' non-legislative activ-
ities. Id.
208. See supra note 81. Cf. 134 CONG. REc. 10,576-77 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Gejdenson). Representative Gejdenson stated:
When you take a look at the volume of our work of the Congress as a whole,
some estimate beyond a million cases a year, that is what restores the faith of
people in the governmental process .... Often our role as advocates may be as
important as our role as legislators in seeing that this Government serves its
people.
Id.
209. Id. One member of the House stated: "[fIt is a fair estimate that Congress handles
over a million constituent cases a year. These include helping constituents on matters of
social security, tax, veteran's benefits, immigration, Medicare and Medicaid, and the whole
array of problems with the Federal Government." Id. at 10,577 (statement of Rep.
Gejdenson)
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sitate the same flexible protection afforded executive and judicial
officials.210
Comparing the Brooks and Barr cases is illustrative of how these legal
theorists would expand the legislative immunity doctrine. In Barr and
Brooks, the defendants were similarly sued for defamation as a result of
criticisms they had made about other citizens in press statements.21' In
Barr, the Court applied the official immunity doctrine to libelous state-
ments made by the acting director of the Office of Rent Stabilization
about his subordinates and found that press releases were within the na-
ture of Barr's office and the "outer perimeter" of his official functions.212
Director Barr was found absolutely immune from suit.213 In Brooks,
however, the court refused to apply the official immunity doctrine to
statements made by Congressman Brooks during a press conference in
his office.214 The Brooks court held that because statements to the press
were not legislative activity envisioned by the Speech or Debate Clause,
Brooks was without immunity.2" 5 If the court had applied the official
In contrast to this account, the actual amount of time spent on constituent matters will
often depend on a member's leadership style, the organization and efficiency of his or her
office staff, and the amount of time a legislator has served in the Congress. The following
anonymous accounts by members of Congress effectively depict the disparities in constitu-
ent work. One member explained:
Much of the work that comes across a congressman's desk has absolutely no
relationship to legislation .... But the fact is that having to deal with these mat-
ters takes vital time that a congressman should be devoting to government and
requires him to do a lot of housekeeping things for constituents.
CHARLES L. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: His WORK As HE SEES IT 61 (Anchor Books
1964) (1963). Another member asserted: "I think I am in disagreement with some people
here who have been more effective in increasing their majorities than I have.... [M]uch of
my [constituent] work would be handled by my staff... I spend 10 percent of my own time
on constituent service and 90 percent on legislation." Id. at 60. It apparently cannot be
said of all members of Congress that constituent duties overwhelm their agendas and take
up most of their time.
210. Demonstrative of this flexibility is the willingness of federal courts to extend offi-
cial immunity coverage to executive and judicial functions that are peripheral to core du-
ties. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (providing official immunity to
an executive official performing adjudicative functions); Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982,
985 (5th Cir. 1980) (extending official immunity to "clerks of court acting in a nonroutine
manner"); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063-67 (8th Cir. 1979) (recognizing
immunity for a judge acting in an executive capacity); see also Claus v. Gyorkey, 674 F.2d
427, 431 (5th Cir. 1982) (maintaining that "[ilt is only necessary that the action of the
federal official bear some reasonable relation to and connection with his duties and re-
sponsibilities to be within the scope of his authority").
211. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 565-67 (1959); Williams v. Brooks, 945 F.2d 1322,
1323-24 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992).
212. Barr, 360 U.S. at 575.
213. Id.
214. Brooks, 945 F.2d at 1330-31.
215. Id.
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immunity doctrine in the Brooks case, however, the suit likely would
have been dismissed.216
Recognizing the functional differences between the legislative branch
and the executive and judicial branches, federal courts have applied mu-
tually exclusive immunity protection to each.217 It is precisely these fun-
damental distinctions that should perpetuate the exclusion of official
immunity to members of Congress.1
The primary function of members of Congress is to legislate as stated
explicitly in Article I of the Constitution219 and implicitly in the Speech
or Debate Clause.220 Legislating entails activities that range far beyond
merely making speeches, voting and debating.22' The Supreme Court has
sustained the protection of these constitutionally mandated functions
from challenges leveled by private citizens and from the executive and
judicial branches through strict application of the Speech or Debate
Clause to a member's legislative functions.222 As a result, members' con-
216. Simarly, Representative Sundquist's letters to the Attorney General, the Legal
Services Corporation and the press likely would have been exempted from liability as a
legitimate aspect of his job had the court applied official immunity. Chastain v. Sundquist,
833 F.2d 311, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Mikva, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240
(1988); see also Batchelder, supra note 6, at 402 (arguing that "Sundquist and other mem-
bers of Congress should have the freedom to investigate suspected improprieties in feder-
ally funded programs without the fear of potential liability for unwarranted defamation
claims").
Most circuit courts have found government officials' statements to the press to be within
the scope of their duties and thus covered by the official immunity doctrine. See, e.g.,
Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985) (ruling that official immunity forecloses
liability for defamation); Williams v. Collins, 728 F.2d 721, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1984) (dis-
missing suit against Army Corps of Engineers investigators for defamatory statements
made while performing official functions); Queen v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 689 F.2d 80,
84 (6th Cir. 1982) (extending immunity from defamation suit to TVA officials), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1082 (1983); George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir. 1980) (granting motion
to dismiss a defamation suit on official immunity grounds), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029
(1981).
217. See supra part I.A. (analyzing legislative immunity via the Speech or Debate
Clause); supra part I.B. (discussing the official immunity doctrine as applied to the execu-
tive and judiciary).
218. The Supreme Court has said that official immunity will not protect an official un-
less his functions so dictate. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810 (1982); Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1973).
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .. .
220. See supra note 1.
221. The Supreme Court has held that issuing subpoenas, pursuing congressional inves-
tigations, and creating reports of committee functions are legislative functions worthy of
Speech or Debate Clause protection. See supra note 2 (noting the Court's holdings in
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 (1975), Doe V. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973), and Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967)).
222. See supra Part I.A.2.-4.
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stitutional authority is preserved and their legislative discretion remains
unfettered.2'
The functions of the executive and judicial branches are quite different,
as the former must execute,224 and the latter interpret the laws enacted
by Congress.22 These responsibilities naturally expose executive and ju-
dicial discretion to the threat of outside intervention.226 Nevertheless,
the Constitution does not protect essential executive and judicial func-
tions as it safeguards legislative functions. Consequently, the Supreme
Court has constructed out of the common law an official immunity doc-
trine to immunize the essential functions of the executive and judicial
branches. 227 This doctrine is exclusive to the executive and judicial
branches because their constitutional duties, without textual immuniza-
tion, are at risk.228
Those who urge the cross-application of the official immunity doctrine
argue that officials in all branches of government have legitimate duties
ranging beyond their core functions and that it is inherently inconsistent
to protect from litigation the peripheral activities of the executive and
judicial branches while leaving the legislature exposed.229 On the con-
trary, it is the inherent differences in the peripheral responsibilities as
they relate to constitutional duties of the respective branches that dictate
the exclusion of official immunity from the legislative branch.
To ensure that "the Laws be faithfully executed,"230 for instance, exec-
utive officials must perform adjudicative functions when deciding admin-
223. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972); United States v. John-
son, 383 U.S. 169, 177-80 (1966). Similarly, the Sundquist court held:
Congress initiates lawmaking activity, an exercise in the art of declaring the gen-
eral law that will govern the nation. As a general matter, no authority can compel
it to act or control the direction of its lawmaking action once engaged, absent a
violation of the Constitution. In this respect, members of Congress enjoy a free-
dom of action vis-A-vis a coordinate branch not shared by executive officials.
Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240
(1988).
224. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.").
225. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ...
arising under ... the Laws of the United States .... ).
226. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,355-57 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 422-23 (1976); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959).
227. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501-02 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
228. See supra note 192; see also Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("The immunity was made absolute because of the predictable prospect that individ-
uals subject to a judge, prosecutor, or grand juror's unfavorable decision would bring suit
and no lesser protection would suffice."), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
229. See supra note 200.
230. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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istrative cases and legislative functions when rule making.23' Likewise,
judicial authority must fulfill a legislative function when dictating a code
of conduct for attorneys and an executive/prosecutorial function when
enforcing that code.232 More importantly, it is these officials, executing
and interpreting congressional enactments through these various means,
who must do so directly with the people, and who are most susceptible to
their litigious wrath.233 The legislative mandate, on the other hand, does
not require protection of a member's nonlegislative functions. The
Supreme Court has made this very clear by consistently construing the
Speech or Debate doctrine to the exclusion of these tasks.234
The Barr/Brooks distinction highlights the functional differences war-
ranting the application of mutually exclusive immunity doctrines.23 5
Again, a libel spoken outside the legislative realm will go unprotected
because a member's constitutional responsibilities do not include such a
function.236 An executive or judicial official, on the other hand, if acting
within the scope of his or her official duties, will be immune from liability
for speaking the same libel.7 Immunity will so attach to preserve the
official's constitutional, statutory or delegated authority.238 Altering this
historical distinction would result only in an unconstitutional redefinition
of legislative functions.
2. Official Immunity for Legislators: An Equivocal Supreme Court?
Some argue that the Supreme Court has neither explicitly nor implic-
itly foreclosed the application of official immunity to members of Con-
gress. 239 In support of this position, advocates put great stock in the
ambiguous statement made by the Supreme Court in footnote thirteen of
231. See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 478.
232. See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 739 (1980) (ex-
tending immunity to members of Virginia Supreme Court for issuing bar code).
233. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 244 (1974) (stating that "the executive
branch ... is most frequently and intimately involved in day-to-day contacts with the citi-
zenry and, hence, most frequently exposed to situations which can give rise to claims").
234. See supra part I.A.
235. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314 (1973) ("We do not doubt the impor-
tance of informing the public about the business of Congress.... [However, a] Member of
Congress may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's stand in his home dis-
trict ....").
237. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
238. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 323 (1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
239. See id. at 330-31 (Mikva, J., dissenting). In summation, Judge Mikva stated: "[Tihe
Supreme Court so far has not discussed in any meaningful way the precise question before
us; and it certainly has not closed the door to further examination of the question." Id. at
331.
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Doe v. McMillan: "Both before and after Barr, official immunity has
been held applicable to officials of the Legislative Branch." 2" Notwith-
standing this dictum, the McMillan opinion lends support to the opposite
conclusion-that the Supreme Court has refused to apply the official im-
munity doctrine to members of Congress.
Although in the McMillan footnote Justice White, writing for the ma-
jority, alluded to the application of the official immunity doctrine to
members of Congress, the Court rejected this possibility in its holding.24'
First, the defendants in the case, the Superintendent of Documents and
the Public Printer, were neither legislative nor executive officials and
were entitled to neither specific statutory nor common law immunity.242
To the extent that they were to receive immunity protection, the vehicle
providing such immunity would have been the doctrine protecting the
government branch with which they were working.243 In this case, the
Superintendent and Printer only could claim that scope of immunity pro-
tection afforded to legislative officials.2 " Similarly, if the executive
branch had delegated them a task, they would have received correspond-
ing official immunity protection equal to that received by executive
branch officials.245 One can infer that although courts may similarly ap-
ply the doctrines of official immunity and Speech or Debate in certain
situations, the doctrines themselves and the breadth of their protection
are dissimilar.246 Second, Justice White clarified any resulting doubt
about this conclusion when he stated specifically that congressmen and
their aides are granted no immunity beyond that which protects their le-
gitimate activity.247
A more subtle indication that Barr-type immunity is inapplicable to
members of Congress is found in the absence of any discussion of the
doctrine in Hutchinson v. Proxmire.2' The facts in Proxmire were agree-
able to an official immunity claim by the defendant.249 Similar to the
factual scenarios in the Sundquist and Brooks cases in which the doctrine
240. 412 U.S. at 319 n.13.
241. Id. at 324.
242. Id. at 323.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 324.
245. Id. at 323.
246. Id. at 322.
247. Id. at 324. The Court explained that "Congressmen and aides are absolutely im-
mune when they are legislating. But when they act outside the 'sphere of legitimate legis-
lative activity,' they enjoy no special immunity from local laws.. . ." Id. (quoting Tenny v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)).
248. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
249. Id. at 114-17; supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
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was raised as a defense, Proxmire involved the publication of an alleged
libel by the defendant, Senator Proxmire.2 50 Furthermore, like the de-
fendant in Barr, Senator Proxmire had criticized certain executive prac-
tices that resulted in a private citizen filing a civil suit against him.251 As
with Barr's press statements, Senator Proxmire's description of waste in
government spending was well within the scope of his official duties.252
Nevertheless, Senator Proxmire appealed to the Speech or Debate
Clause for immunity without mentioning the official immunity defense.253
There are two ways of analyzing the conspicuous absence of an official
immunity defense in Proxmire. First, Senator Proxmire and the Court
assumed that Speech or Debate was the only immunity doctrine available
to members of Congress, as dictated by the McMillan opinion six years
earlier.2 4 Second, if there had been a nonconstitutional, common law
doctrine available to members of Congress, the Court would have
avoided the constitutional question and applied the common law doc-
trine.255 Under either theory, the Speech or Debate Clause did not ap-
ply to the Senator's libelous remarks and official immunity was not
available to him.256
250. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 114-17.
251. Id. at 130.
252. Id. at 133 (calling news and press releases "[v]aluable and desirable").
253. Id. at 130.
254. See supra notes 95-105.
255. If the Supreme Court had determined that the official immunity doctrine applied
to members of Congress, the case could have been remanded to the court of appeals to
consider the state law issues. On this issue, the Court has stated that "[olur practice is to
avoid reaching constitutional questions if a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is avail-
able." Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 122; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175,
193 (1909). Cf Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (commenting on
the McMillan holding that "[n]or does it seem plausible that a case can be litigated all the
way to the Supreme Court without anyone taking notice of a winning defense"), cert. de-
nied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
256. Some argue that because courts have applied the qualified immunity arm of the
official immunity doctrine to members of Congress, application of the absolute immunity
arm of the same doctrine should naturally follow. See supra note 149 (discussing the quali-
fied immunity doctrine). Although this Comment specifically addresses the absolute im-
munity arm of the official immunity doctrine, these arguments warrant some discussion.
Two cases applying the qualified immunity doctrine to members of Congress arise out of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See McSurely v.
McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 99-102 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985);
Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 932-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984). In
both cases, the court suggested that members performing nonlegislative official functions,
challenged as violating statutory and constitutional law, could find immunity protection in
the qualified immunity doctrine. See McSurely, 753 F.2d at 99-100; Walker, 733 F.2d at
932. Proponents of applying the official immunity doctrine to Congress conclude that the
McSurely and Walker holdings presuppose the extension of absolute official immunity to
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3. Dispositive Policy
A central argument for critics of the current legislative immunity
doctrine is that public policy commands the application of Barr-type im-
munity to members of Congress." 7  First, critics argue that the same
principles guiding the application of executive and judicial official immu-
nity must similarly direct implementation of official immunity to mem-
bers' nonlegislative duties. Such principles include: encouraging the
vigorous performance of official duties;258 encouraging entrance into
public service;259 preventing official inaction and cowardly decision-mak-
ing;26° and removing the onus of time-consuming litigation.261 Second,
they maintain that representation involves communication between mem-
bers and their constituents that cannot be achieved merely through the
common law torts committed by members. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 333 (Mikva, J.,
dissenting).
The Walker court itself contradicted this corollary when it said that "the Supreme Court
has instructed that absolute immunity for members of Congress does not extend beyond
the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause." Walker, 733 F.2d at 932. Furthermore, the
dissent in Walker noted that "[i]n light of the Supreme Court's ruling that Speech or De-
bate immunity constitutes the sole separation-of-powers barrier to adjudication of such
cases, the majority's indication that qualified official immunity might shield defendants
from liability in this case is puzzling." Id. at 937 n.7 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Note also
that the Walker court refused to apply the qualified immunity doctrine. Id. at 933 (major-
ity opinion) ("The blank record and misdirected argument now before us, in short, supply
no justification for dismissing this action on a qualified immunity ground.").
Unlike the Walker case, the McSurely court held the defendant congressman and his
aide immune from constitutional and statutory liability. McSurely, 753 F.2d at 110. The
court, however, assumed the extension of qualified immunity without any discussion of its
background or validity. Id. Nor was there mention of the absolute immunity doctrine. Id.
Taking from the opinion's precedential quality, the court did conclude: "The legal world
will little note nor long remember the fine lines that have been drawn in this opinion .... It
will be enough if our opinion finally ends this sorry chapter of investigative excess." Id. at
115.
As the preceding discussion reveals, not only is the conclusion that absolute official im-
munity applies to members specifically denied, but the prospect of qualified immunity for
members in these cases stands on shaky legal grounds.
257. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 331 (Mikva, J., dissenting); Immunity Hearings, supra
note 6, at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Brooks); Brooks Brief, supra note 10, at 37; Batchelder,
supra note 6, at 402; McDonald, supra note 10, at 1121.
258. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 330.
259. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 120, at 529 n.19 (highlighting the negative impact that
eliminating official immunity protection would have on the qualified employment pool).
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (suggesting that the
threat of such litigation would unnecessarily hamper executive branch officials in the "un-
flinching discharge of their duties"), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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passage and enactment of legislation.262 Third, members must be free to
inform their constituents, respond to their needs, and keep them apprised
of government activities.263 Finally, critics emphasize that legislators, the
only officials whom the Constitution explicitly protects, actually receive
the least amount of immunity protection as a direct result of this textual
protection. 2 4 The executive and judiciary, receiving no constitutional
immunity, emerge with broader protection. In their view, this disparity
makes no practical sense.265
Undeniably, each of the policy arguments would bolster significantly
the existing legislative immunity doctrine. Furthermore, maintaining the
vitality of members' nonlegislative responsibilities to meet these policy
concerns is a realistic and necessary concern. Achieving these goals, how-
ever, need not and cannot be accomplished by providing members of
Congress with extra-constitutional immunity protection.
First, the duties to which these policy mandates attach historically have
been determined by the constitutional and statutory responsibilities of
the various officials.266 Courts have granted common law immunity to
judges, prosecutors and grand jurors because performance of their consti-
tutional, statutory, and delegated duties would be impossible without
it.267 The same holds true for executive officials, including both depart-
ment heads2 68 and lower level officials. 269 Courts have never granted this
form of immunity to members, as suggested above, because their consti-
tutional functions and the policy concerns that affect these functions are
262. See 134 CONG. REC. 10,576 (1988) (statement of Rep. Michel) ("If we are unable
to speak forthrightly and fairly within the bounds of our official duties, we will be less able
to represent the people we are elected to serve.").
263. See Brooks Brief, supra note 10, at 37 ("[I]f officials do not receive official immu-
nity, they [will] hesitate to give public statements in their official capacities."); Batchelder,
supra note 6, at 404.
264. See 134 CoNG. REC. 10,576 (1988) (statement of Rep. Michel); Brooks Brief, supra
note 10, at 37 n.25. But see Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723, 725 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987)
(noting that "judicial immunity affords less protection than legislative immunity under the
Speech or Debate Clause") (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 30 (1980))), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987).
265. Eades, 810 F.2d at 725 n.1.
266. See Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing the di-
verse constitutional functions of the three federal branches of government which dictate
separate forms of immunity protection), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
267. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976) (granting grand jurors official
immunity); see also Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. (13 Wall.) 503 (1927) (granting prosecutorial
immunity); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) (granting immunity to judges).
268. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (holding that "[t]he interests of
the people require that due protection be accorded" to the "heads of Executive Depart-
ments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law.").
269. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573 (1959).
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absolutely protected by the Constitution itself.270 Members can lobby
their colleagues to push bills through the legislative process; they can di-
rect their staff to gather information or conduct oversight hearings to gain
support and momentum for their initiatives; and, whether necessary or
not, they can libel anyone with impunity in the House or Senate chamber
or in committee. As a result, members can vigorously pursue their legis-
lative agendas without fear of a lawsuit. The populace need not worry
about inaction or cowardice of members afraid to pursue policy-making.
And potential candidates can rest assured that upon election they will be
able to push their constituents' interests forward through legislation with-
out unwanted litigation hampering their efforts.
Second, although communications between members and constituents
are an essential ingredient of representative government, refusing to ex-
pand legislative immunity to accommodate the official immunity doctrine
will not impair members' non-legislative performance. Members' com-
munications with constituents will not suffer. For instance, members may
use their franking privileges, news conferences, press releases, and
speeches in their home districts to inform, establish strong ties with, and
solicit viewpoints from their constituents. Members of Congress need
only adhere to the manifest rules of proper official conduct articulated in
the limited body of legislative immunity cases,27 which forbid them from
defaming others through nonlegislative, unprotected means.272
Members are accustomed to tailoring their legislative and nonlegisla-
tive behavior to abide by a wide range of rules2 73 and statutes. 274 For
270. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). Underscoring the essen-
tial policy requirements satisfied by the Speech or Debate Clause, Justice Frankfurter
stated that "[Ilegislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good." Like Justice
Frankfurter, Justice Harlan in Barr focused on the satisfaction of legislative policy require-
ments by the Speech or Debate Clause before going on to discuss a comparable nexus
between the official immunity doctrine and the various officials protected by it. Barr, 360
U.S. at 569-70.
271. See supra part I.A.
272. See supra text accompanying note 81 text (detailing unprotected, non-legislative
activity); supra note 203 (discussing historical tradition dictating the scope of protected
activity).
273. Pursuant to a federal statute and separate House rules, members of both the
House and Senate must abide by recent bans on honoraria. 5 U.S.C. app. 7, § 501(b)
(Supp. IV 1992) (adding section 501(b) to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978); House
Rule XLIII, cl. 1(a)(1)(B); House Rule XLIII, cl. 5. Accordingly, members are forbidden
from receiving compensation for speeches, appearances, or articles subject to certain lim-
ited exceptions. See HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCr, HOUSE ETH-
ICS MANUAL, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1992).
274. Federal criminal law prohibits a member from receiving a bribe-something of
value in return for being influenced-or from receiving an illegal gratuity-for or because
of an official act. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988) (bribery statute); id. § 201(c) (illegal gratu-
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instance, in representing constituent interests before administrative agen-
cies, members may intervene to urge action or reconsideration of a mat-
ter, express opinions on pending issues, gather information and status
reports, or secure appointments.275 But to intervene, they must abide by
certain standards of conduct. For example, federal law prohibits a mem-
ber of Congress from communicating with an administrative agency off-
the-record on the merits of a particular matter under formal agency con-
sideration-termed an ex parte communication.276 Members have notice
of these rules and traditions and should conduct themselves
accordingly.277
ities statute); see also McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807, 1815-17 (1991) (discuss-
ing the quid pro quo element of bribery); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 71-4
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (construing the bribery and illegal gratuities statute). See generally
HousE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 52-56 (1992) (discussing bribery and illegal gratuity statutes). Federal stat-
utes also prohibit extortion-inducing an action under the color of official right. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(2); Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992) (construing the extortion
statute).
275. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding a
member's right to represent constituent's interest before agency despite allegations of im-
propriety); D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1256-62 (D.C. Cir.) (refus-
ing to vacate agency ruling despite alleged improper influence by congressman), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Pillsbury Co. v. Federal tade Comm'n, 354 F.2d 952, 963-65
(5th Cir. 1966) (vacating administrative adjudicatory ruling as a result of improper inter-
vention by member); see also SELECT COMMIrEE ON ETHICS, INVESTIGATION OF SENA-
TOR ALAN CRANSTON, S. REP. No. 102-223, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (analyzing the
"Keating Five" investigation). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL
CONDUCT, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 239-59 (1992) (analyzing
casework considerations).
276. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1988) (ex parte statute); see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.) (ruling that ex parte communications that produce information
relevant to a rulemaking must be disclosed on the record), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1992) ("The ex parte rule is designed to preserve the due process
rights of all parties to administrative proceedings.").
277. Congressman Sundquist, for instance, could have levelled the same allegations
about petitioner Chastain's harassment of local officials and consorting with felons without
going to the press. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1240 (1988). His allegations would have been protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause had he spread them in legislative debate, at a committee hearing, or during Special
Orders. See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text. Ultimately, and without serious
delay, the same message would have reached his constituents. Id.
Similarly, Congressman Brooks, with impunity, could have stated that plaintiff Williams
was a ""'small-time hustler.' ... Williams v. Brooks, 945 F.2d 1322, 1324 (5th Cir. 1991)
(quoting complaint), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992). It would appear-given that the
Continuing Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1987 specifically related to the contro-
versy-that Congressman Brooks instead might have delivered these words in a protected
legislative forum. Id. at 1323-24.
This analysis involves a considerable amount of hindsight. Nonetheless, both Congress-
men Sundquist and Brooks had notice that their activity would not be protected.
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Third, members' ability to inform their constituents is not chilled by
adherence to these principles.278 In fact, the advent of nationally tele-
vised debate in the House and Senate has mooted most arguments ques-
tioning the effectiveness of the informing function.27 9 The House of
Representatives, for instance, opens its daily sessions with miscellaneous
speeches and concludes with a period of "Special Orders."28 This pro-
vides members with an opportunity to address their constituents and the
nation on any topic without being constrained by the House's stringent
debate rules that apply during regular business. For instance, on Septem-
ber 14, 1992, Congressman Henry Gonzalez stood before the House of
Representatives during "Special Orders" and condemned alleged crimi-
nal conduct by the executive branch over American foreign policy in Iraq
before the Gulf War,281 and in the process, revealed allegedly classified
and contentious materials.282 Not only were Congressman Gonzales's
orations immune from lawsuit as protected speech under the Speech or
Debate Clause, but, as a result of the heavy media coverage of his ac-
tions, his home state constituents and the nation presumably gained infor-
mation regarding activities of the federal government. 83 Thus, critics'
fears of a curtailed informing function are misplaced.
Fourth, the unequal apportionment of immunity protection reflects the
vulnerability to suit of executive and judicial officials as compared to leg-
islative officials who may pose a threat to the citizenry.' The inequality
278. See Immunity Hearings, supra note 6, at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Brooks) (sug-
gesting that exposing members' non-legislative conduct to liability would have a "chilling
effect" on members' obligation to inform constituents on controversial issues).
279. See generally SuLA P. RICHARDSON, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS
FOR FEDERAL LIMIFS FOR FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATORS: BACKGROUND AND RE-
CENT STATE AcriviTY 9 (1993) ("A number of the speeches made by Members during
televised floor proceedings or hearings are ideally suited for television, in that they can
serve as effective 'visual press releases."') (quoting ILONA B. NICKELS, U.S. LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, ONE-MINUTE SPEECHES: HOUSE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 (1990)).
280. House of Representatives Rule 14, cl. 2 authorizes the Speaker of House to recog-
nize members who request permission to address the House for up to one hour, whether in
one-minute or "special order" speeches. House Rule XIV, cl. 2.
281. 138 CONG. REC. H8349-56 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1992)
282. 138 CONG. REC. H8738 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (recording refusal of a majority of
the House to investigate Congressman Gonzalez charged in violation of House rules for
divulging classified information regarding the Iraqgate controversy during Special Orders).
283. Louis DuBose, The Scourge of 'Iraqgate', CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 26, 1992,
at 18 (detailing contents of classified CIA letter regarding the BNL bank scandal revealed
by Representative Gonzales on the House floor); Elaine Sciolino, Iraq Policy Assailed in
Bank Case, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 15, 1992, at D1 (same); Simon Tisdall, Baker 'Signed Clear-
ance for Iraqi Arms Company', THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 19, 1992, at 24 (same); MacNeill
Lehrer News Hour: Iraqgate Update (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 8, 1992) (same), avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, 'Tanscript File.
284. See supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
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is inevitable and essential. To fulfill their constitutional, statutory, and
delegated responsibilities, executive and judicial officials face daily en-
forcement decisions that impact directly upon specific individuals.S
Conversely, it is precisely the impact that members' nonlegislative ac-
tions and the "political" motivations underlying them can have upon indi-
vidual citizens that dictates the foreclosure of official immunity to these
functions. Members have nearly unencumbered access to their constitu-
ents via the media286 and the franking privilege. With ease, a member
can address his or her constituency under the pretense of official or polit-
ical necessity and, in the process, personally malign a private citizen or a
candidate challenging his or her incumbency.' 7  The citizen or
nonincumbent candidate, on the other hand, may lack this access to the
media and the public and therefore probably has limited ability to rebut
such an attack.
Furthermore, members of Congress often will employ nonlegislative
aspects of their office to facilitate reelection. Writing for the Brewster
Court, Justice Burger referred to nonlegislative activities as "political in
nature" and "a means of developing continuing support for future elec-
tions.''2" Likewise, members themselves have noted the extent to which
some of their colleagues abuse their official functions to gain reelection,
frequently at the expense of effective lawmaking." 9 Conversely, because
executive (below the President) and judicial officials are nonelected, their
full range of official activities may not be motivated by political gain to
the same extent as legislators. Therefore, the apparent inequity in appor-
tionment of common law immunity to members is justified by the need to
285. See Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311,321 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1240 (1988).
286. See generally SULA RICHARDSON, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL
TERMS OF OFFICE AND TENURE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
40 n.112 (1991) ("'Members of Congress can provide their own press coverage; hometown
newspapers often print Representatives' press releases, and local television stations use
their satellite-forwarded film clips."') (quoting Mark Ttishnet et al., Judicial Review and
Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEx. L. REV. 967, 973-74 (1988)).
287. See Williams v. Brooks, 945 F.2d 1322, 1323 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1996 (1992); Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 313.
288. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
289. One member stated:
I am tremendously concerned about the amount of time congressmen spend in
selling their wares to constituents.... The real question is whether it has become
part of our existence to campaign not so much on whether or not we are doing a
good job or representing the basic thinking of our people .... If they see the
name often enough, they will buy it once more. I think that is one of our real
problems.
See CLAPP, supra note 209, at 59.
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safeguard the electorate from legislators' potential abuse of their public
office.
Finally, extending absolute immunity to members' nonlegislative activi-
ties would prove problematic for the courts, which ultimately are respon-
sible for maintaining proper immunity protection for members of
Congress. Members would call upon the courts to protect their libelous
attacks upon private citizens, political opponents, or anyone else person-
ally maligned. To avoid sanctioning such conduct, the courts would have
to construct arbitrary limits on what they would consider official func-
tions deserving absolute immunity. For instance, the courts might have to
distinguish between member-constituent communications facilitating the
informing function and those communications representing a vehicle for
personal vengeance or political posturing. This would require the judici-
ary to affix new standards to the legislative immunity doctrine where no
precedent exists to justify the intrusion. The result would be to afflict an
historically consistent immunity doctrine designed to protect members'
essential legislative functions with an arbitrarily constructed, politically
charged expansion of immunized conduct. In turn, augmentation of such
a doctrine could impose an immense administrative burden on the courts.
Strong public policy mandates avoiding such a burden.
III. A PROPOSAL: REACHING FORWARD FOR THE STATUS Quo
Despite the volume of commentary to the contrary, the legislative im-
munity doctrine must not extend beyond the Speech or Debate Clause.
The teachings of the Constitution's Framers, the functional distinctions
between the duties of legislators and executive and judicial officials, and
steadfast public policy standards command this conclusion. The conduit
for recent efforts to expand the legislative immunity doctrine has been
defamation suits against members of Congress.2 ° In response, critics of
the status quo have attempted to graft the common law doctrine of offi-
cial immunity onto the legislative immunity doctrine.291 The courts must
resist these attempts.
First, the courts must adhere to the scope of protection articulated by
the Framers. The Framers incorporated the Speech or Debate Clause
into the Constitution to insure the independence of the congressional leg-
islative mandate.29 They did so with the knowledge that private forces
and the other two branches inevitably would seek to impact upon that
290. See supra notes 151-69 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 173 and 200 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 35.
Catholic University Law Review
legislative authority. 293 Consequently, the immunity they extended was
absolute.
The scope of that immunity, however, was confined to the legislative
sphere.294 Contrary to what critics may argue,295 the scope of legislative
immunity envisioned by the Framers could not have included the modern
range of members' nonlegislative activities.296 Not only did the Framers
emphasize legislators' general accountability to the electorate for im-
proper conduct, but they specifically forbade protection of members'
libelous statements outside the chambers of Congress.297 The Supreme
Court and the circuit courts have responded to the Framers' intentions by
providing legislative immunity only to members' legislative duties and
only through the Speech or Debate Clause.298
Second, the purpose of both the legislative immunity and official im-
munity doctrines has been to protect the respective officials' essential
functions.299 It is imperative that executive officials carrying out the laws
be able to "legislate" through rulemaking and "adjudicate" through for-
mal agency procedures. 3" Judicial officials must likewise be able to per-
form the full range of their official functions, which includes rulemaking
and enforcement.3° ' Courts should protect these varied functions to their
"outer periphery" because they impact directly upon private citizens and
leave the officials otherwise vulnerable to private civil suits. If, for exam-
ple, an executive official were to announce publicly allegations of crimi-
nal conduct by a specific private citizen in light of an impending
investigation, that official would be immune from any defamation suit
filed against him or her.3"2
A legislator's primary constitutional responsibility is to consider the en-
actment of laws. The Constitution will protect absolutely any duty inte-
gral to that process from civil and criminal suits filed by the executive, the
judiciary, or the citizenry.303 Courts also have broadly interpreted these
legislative actions to ensure a member's absolute discretion. Therefore, if
a member chooses to defame a private citizen on the House floor for one
293. In fact, the Supreme Court has considered suits filed by the private sector and the
other branches of government only 11 times. See supra note 2.
294. See supra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 203.
298. See supra parts I.A., I.C.
299. See supra notes 217-38 and accompanying text.
300. See supra part I.B.2.
301. See supra part I.B.1.
302. See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), afj'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
303. See supra part I.A.
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hour during a nationally televised debate, he or she may do so with impu-
nity.3° For any action falling outside the legislative sphere, however, a
member must be held liable to the same extent that private citizens are
accountable to one another."0 5 Therefore, just as one private citizen may
not libel another, neither may a member take advantage of his or her
public notoriety and easy access to the national media to libel a private
citizen or political opponent beyond the context of congressional debate.
Such activity is not legislative, albeit "political" in a more general sense.
Third, public policy traditions further prescribe maintenance of mutu-
ally exclusive immunity doctrines. Public policy dictates that members of
Congress vigorously perform their legislative functions without the threat
of time-consuming litigation that would chill this ability. Speech or De-
bate Clause immunity provides this protection. By contrast, it is the
unencumbered execution and interpretation of the laws that for over a
century has fixed the application of the official immunity doctrine.3°
Each of the distinct immunity doctrines meets the policy needs of the
officials to whom it applies; neither deserves the intrusion of the other.30 7
Furthermore, although many member-constituent activities are guided
by longstanding rules and statutes,308 it is within the area of direct com-
munications between a member and constituents where specific statutes
and congressional rules do not reach and where a member can most in-
jure a private citizen or political opponent. Consequently, the courts sim-
ply have refused to extend legislative immunity to nonlegislative
communications.30 9 Critics of the existing legislative immunity doctrine
describe the demise of these networks of communications and with them
the informing function. Members are on notice, however, and have a
choice. They are aware of what they cannot say in a nonlegislative capac-
ity and are equally cognizant that they can say anything they please in a
legislative forum. At a time when societal trust of Congress has declined
and citizens are demanding heightened accountability from their elected
officials, the courts must not free national legislators to engage in political
or personal activity heretofore not immunized from scrutiny.
304. For a variety of legislative functions, members of Congress will be held immune
from liability. See supra text notes 79-80.
305. See supra notes 165, 203 and accompanying text.
306. See supra part I.B.
307. See supra notes 266-89 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
309. See supra parts I.A., I.C.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of legislative immunity currently extends only to House
and Senate members' legislative activity through the Speech or Debate
Clause of the United States Constitution. Critics of the existing doctrine
assert that courts must equally protect members' nonlegislative, constitu-
ent-related responsibilities. They argue that courts should extend the
common law official immunity doctrine, historically applied to the execu-
tive and judicial branches exclusively, to these nonlegislative functions.
At the core of legislative immunity development and jurisprudence, how-
ever, is the goal of protecting the institutional independence of the legis-
lative function, not the attendant political activities that arguably enable
individual members to be more "effective" in their roles. Incorporating
official immunity as part of the legislative immunity doctrine not only
would sabotage this underlying principle, but also would undermine the
basic legal and policy tenets articulated by the Framers, the Constitution,
and the courts.
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